[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
does better. This theory is intended to apply only to cases in which we
will harm innocent, nonthreatening persons who are themselves not
already under a comparable threat. It is a non-state-of-mind theory,
unlike the DTE(R) and DDE(R). I believe we can discover it by con-
sidering intuitive responses to cases and trying to explain their under-
lying deep structure. However, rather than strictly follow the order of
discovery, I shall first present each component of the theory, followed
by discussion of cases in which intuitions can be accounted for by the
component. Finally, I shall offer a doctrine that both summarizes the
components and tries to provide an underlying, morally satisfying
rationale for them.
(1) The first thing we can show on the basis of intuitions in cases is
that it is permissible for greater good already achieved to cause lesser
evil*. Then, the good that justifies lesser evil* causes it. For example,
suppose the trolley is headed to the five, and though we cannot redi-
rect the trolley, we can move the five. Unfortunately, we know that we
can only move them to land that is loosely packed and that their pres-
ence in this threat-free area will cause a landslide. We know this land-
slide will kill one person below. Intuitively, I believe it is permissible
to move the five, foreseeably causing the lesser evil*. This is accounted
for by the permissibility of greater good causing lesser evil*.
If only greater good might permissibly cause lesser evil*, a principle
of our morality would be that the good that justifies evil* should cause
it. (Acts that cause the greater good that, in turn, causes lesser evil*
are, of course, permitted.) This would be a strong version of non-
consequentialism, since the good is not a causal consequence of evil*
or of means that have evil* as a side effect. Nonconsequentialism is
usually understood minimally as the denial that all that matters to the
rightness or wrongness of acts is the goodness of the consequences. But it also
denies that all that matters is the state of affairs, including the act itself
and its consequences. For example, it claims that an act of killing A that
will prevent more acts of killing B, C, and D may be impermissible,
even if the state of affairs including that act and its consequences is
better than the state of affairs without that act and its consequences.15
(Perhaps nonconsequentialism should instead be called non-state-of-
affairsism.) If it were a requirement that the good that justifies evil*
should cause it, nonconsequentialism would be concerned that the
166 F. M. Kamm
greater good not be the causal consequence of evil*. It would involve
a downstream principle, in that evil* would have to be causally
subsequent to good.
(2) We can go further, however. Although greater good may permis-
sibly cause lesser evil*, it is not required that evil* only come about in
this way. Events that have greater good as (what I will call) a noncausal flip
side or aspect may cause, or lead to events that cause, lesser evil*. By non-
causal I mean something tighter than causation, sometimes identity,
sometimes constitution. Another way of putting this is that events that
per se cause lesser evil* should either (a) be noncausally related to the
greater good or (b) be caused by events that are noncausally related to
the greater good.16 Other events may only lead to lesser evil* by way
of such events. These claims account for intuitions in several cases. In
the Trolley Case, intuitively we think we may turn the trolley that
causes the death of one. In the context where only the trolley threatens
the five, the turning of the trolley threat away from them by which I
mean the moving of the trolley itself away is the same event as or
consists in their becoming free of threats, and this is the same event as
their becoming saved. Hence there is a noncausal relation between the
turning away of the trolley and the five becoming saved. Furthermore,
the state of affairs of their being saved is noncausally related to these
events in that context.17 Because this is true, I will say that the five being
saved (the greater good) is the noncausal flip side of the turning of the
trolley. Intuitively, I mean to distinguish this noncausal relation from a
less tight, ordinary causal relation that could connect the turning of
the trolley and the saving of people, as in the following Van Case: A
van is headed toward killing twenty people. If we turn the trolley away
from hitting five, the diverted trolley will gently push into those twenty
and move them away from the van. Here the saving of the twenty is
simply a causal consequence of the moving trolley. It contrasts with the
relation between the five being saved and the moving of the trolley
away from them. This is the contrast, as slim as it seems, that I think
is crucial.18
Intuitively, it is permissible to do acts (e.g., push a button that redi-
rects the trolley) that cause the event that has greater good as a non-
causal flip side and lesser evil as an effect. We can explain this by noting
that pushing the button an event that per se does not have greater
good as a noncausal flip side or aspect also does not per se cause the
death of the one. It causes the death of the one by causing the trolley
to be diverted, and this diversion has the greater good as its noncausal
flip side.
If pushing the button that turns the trolley away from the five itself
sent out a death ray killing one, intuitively, I think, it would be imper-
Toward the Essence of Nonconsequentialism 167
missible to push the button. What underlies this intuition, I think, is
the fact that the event that per se causes the death would not have the
greater good as its noncausal flip side, nor be caused by an event that
does, nor would it be an event that causes the death by way of either
of these two sorts of events. Rather, the event that per se causes death
would have the greater good as a further causal consequence, since it
would cause the trolley to be diverted and this would have the greater
good as a noncausal flip side.
In a similar vein, consider the Wiggle the Bridge Case: The trolley is
headed under a bridge to the five. We know that if we wiggle the
bridge, this will stop the trolley. However, we also know that wiggling
the bridge will, as a useless side effect, topple a person over the bridge
to his death. Intuitively, I think wiggling is impermissible. Wiggling the
bridge causes a death, just as the moving trolley does, but unlike the
moving trolley, it has only a causal relation to the greater good, since
it leads to the greater good by causing the trolley to move away from
the five. Furthermore, wiggling neither is caused by an event with a
noncausal relation to the greater good nor causes the death solely by
way of causing such an event. I think this is what underlies the intu-
ition that wiggling the bridge is impermissible.
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]