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naive to think that placing all "biological laboratories under the
WHO's control," would have made any difference. Americans
were sharing secrets with the Russians through the WHO
network anyway.
Moreover, the WHO made it clear that security wasn't an issue.
They expressed their objections to safeguarding DNA research
this way:
"The requirements for high security laboratories may be an
inordinate burden (who, in fact will pay for them?) in relation to
the prospective gains. The best strategy here seems to be the
development of safe vectors: plasmids and bacteria engineered to
have little chance of survival outside the laboratory. In fact, in the
long run this is a safer procedure than relying upon uncertain
human compliance with fixed rules and regulations." [13]
Discussing the "remaining controversies" in the field of genetic
splicing and hazardous germ development - techniques that
require "rather complicated analyses of the remotest kinds of
risks," WHO reported:
"Those who regard themselves as guardians of the public safety
must count not only the speculative hazards of these marginal
situations, but also the costs to the public health of impeding their
investigation."
"This partly voluntaristic [recommended] approach will not
satisfy a demand for absolute assurance that no foolish
experiment is ever attempted. But the history of human
institutions should suffice to show that no system of sanctions
can have such a perfect outcome." [11]
These were the WHO's reservations to safeguarding hazardous
gene research despite the fact that the one who brought the issue
of increasing security to the floor of WHO debate was Professor
Lederberg. The world renowned geneticist, Lederberg, at the
time, was serving as a member of the WHO's Advisory
Committee on Medical Research. [13]
The Proponents of CBW Research 
My computer search also revealed that though opponents of
CBW research appeared to outnumber proponents by at least
three to one, the typical BW advocacy position was expressed in
numerous publications. Donald McCrary in Science, for instance,
wrote:
"What is apparently overlooked and totally ignored by these
petitioners is that [the war in Vietnam] . . . is not an academic
exercise divorced from life and death. It is a very real exercise in
how to achieve a goal, however distasteful, with a minimum of
casualties among our own combat personnel. I believe that any
technique, weapon, tactic, or strategy that will minimize
casualties among our combat personnel is right, and any
technique, tactic, or strategy that preserves the combat
effectiveness of our opponent is wrong." [14]
But in March 1970, even WHO consultants noted that all
biological agents permit the danger that if a disease capable of
spreading widely is produced, it may get out of control and
become "a source of disaster to the attacker as well as the
attacked."
"The viral infections suitable for use in warfare include yellow
fever, tick-borne encephalitis, Japanese encephalitis, dengue,
Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), chikungunya, O'nyong-
nyong, Rift Valley fever, influenza, and small-pox. Tick-borne
encephalitis may be taken as an example of the agents belonging
to this group. Susceptibility is almost universal, and the ease with
which the Far Eastern virus can be grown in the laboratory and
its high infectivity and lethality by the aerosol route make it
likely that a case fatality rate of 25% would be achieved. . . ."
"The attacking country could, of course, attempt to protect itself,
e.g., by immunization, but. . . more virulent forms of the
organism concerned might develop or the massive doses used
might be such that ordinary levels of immunity would be useless.
Thus it is possible that biological agents may be used
tactically, rather than strategically, to achieve the
simultaneous infection of key groups of people, and the
military consequences might well be of major importance. . . .
A decision to develop chemical and biological weap-ons implies
that they will ultimately be used." [emphasis added]
The consultants even predicted "a virulent mutant" that could
"spread rapidly to produce an uncontrollable epidemic on a large
scale." In addition, they warned, if mutants were deliberately
produced, there was the "ever-present risk of an accidental
escape." [15]
Psychosocial Consequences 
WHO consultants additionally predicted grave psychosocial
consequences of such an escape, including mass hysteria:
"They thus present a real danger that is conducive to both anxiety
and fear. Anxiety in particular may result from the fact that many
chemical and all biological agents are undetectable by the senses,
so that there are no warning signs to enable people to defend
themselves. In addition, with biological agents, there is the latent
period between infection and illness and the fact that the extent to
which an infection may spread through a community is
unpredictable. As a result, an exposed person cannot be sure
whether he has been infected or know how ill he will be or when
the danger has passed. A further confusing factor is that many of
the symptoms of illness are also symptoms of emotional stress."
[15]
That sounded remarkably similar to the "fear of AIDS epidemic"
I had frequently written and talked about. [l6-I8]
In the event of an attack, the researchers added:
"Panic. . . may be so great that. . . those who have not been
affected will view those who have as potential agents of disease.
The response to a chemical or biological attack may require
precautionary or other measures on such a scale that
extraordinary means of social control will have to be introduced
and these may remain in force long after the need for them has
passed. Thus, an attack may lead to social changes out of all
proportion to the actual damage done."
Isn't that interesting, I thought. They even predicted social
changes like the need to legislate AIDS as a disability rather than
a disease, and requiring infection control measures that have yet
to prove their value in saving costs or lives.
WHO consultants further predicted that the masses would try to
avoid anything that would bring them in contact with deadly
germs. Much of this avoidance was expected to be
disproportionate to the actual risk.
In my role as a health professional AIDS educator, I recalled
several similar experiences. One had occurred a few weeks
earlier following a television interview in Rockford, Illinois. A
viewer called me at the station to express her concern about
leaving her house. The last time she went shopping, she said a
storekeeper handed her a box of laundry detergent. She noticed a
few cuts on his hands and refused to touch him or the box. She
just panicked, left the store, and hadn't gone shopping since.
"Even though casual contact can't transmit HIV," I said to the
station receptionist, "people are still afraid-especially of shaking
hands with AIDS patients or HIV carriers." Exactly what was [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]